
Chapter 8

Building a Security Community in Northeast Asia?

The Six Party Talks and Beyond

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I. Introduction - Why discuss "security community" building in Northeast Asia?

In the post-Cold War era, in addition to the traditional concepts of security such as balance of power and alliances, new concepts such as "cooperative security," "human security" have gained status. Due to the efforts of think tanks and experts in the field, the Asia-Pacific region has learned to embrace those ideas and incorporate them into the lexicon and policies in the region¹). The concept of "security community" has also entered the stage.

Governments in East Asia have come to embrace the idea of "East Asia Community" as a future policy goal in recent years. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 were catalysts in raising the need for regional initiatives to cope with economic and security instabilities. Creation of a "community" including a "security community" is a goal of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). The 2003 ASEAN Bali Concord II explicitly set as a goal, the building of an ASEAN Community—a security community, economic community, socio-cultural community—by 2020.²) South Korea,

1) David Capie and Paul Evans, *The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002). The Japanese version, by Akiko Fukushima, *Lexicon: Ajia Taiheiyō Anzenhoshō Taiwa* (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyōronsha, 2002).

Japan and China have joined in this effort to build a broader East Asia community. Through the ASEAN+3 framework, member countries envision the establishment of a broader East Asia community as a long term objective, by deepening functional cooperation in the political, security, economic and social/cultural areas.³⁾

ASEAN+3 initiatives for an East Asia community, certainly has implications for Northeast Asia. The "+3" partners, China, South Korea and Japan form the Northeast Asia component, and it would be in the interests of those countries to create a "Northeast Asia regional community" as part of a larger East Asia community. Northeast Asia is a subregion where the interests of the four powers, China, Japan, Russia and the United States, and the two Koreas are intrinsically intertwined, and an area where region-wide cooperation or "regional community" -thinking is most underdeveloped in East Asia⁴⁾. As Gilbert Rozman concluded in his extensive study on Northeast Asia, regionalism has been pursued in the past 15 years during the post-Cold War period by each of the members but has failed so far (Democratic People's Republic of Korea[hereafter, North Korea] has chosen limited isolation, and did not pursue regionalism).⁵⁾

2) Declaration of the ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), October 7, 2003, <http://www.asean.org>; Joint Communique of the 37th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Jakarta, Indonesia, 29-30 June 2004.

3) China, in 2003, and Japan in 2004, has acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). South Korea is considering accession. Chairman's Press Statement, Fifth ASEAN+3 Foreign Ministers Meeting, 1 July 2004, Jakarta, Indonesia. "Tokyo Declaration for the Dynamic and Enduring Japan-ASEAN Partnership in the New Millennium," Japan-ASEAN Summit, December, 2003, Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://mofa.go.jp>. Within the ASEAN+3 framework, former South Korean president Kim Dae Jung took the initiative to establish the East Asia Vision Group (private experts) and the East Asia Study Group (government) to study East Asia community building. The Council on East Asian Community (CEAC) (<http://www.ceac.jp>) was established May 2004, as a Japanese counterpart to platforms in other countries.

4) "Northeast Asia" would also include Mongolia and Taiwan, by geography, but for purposes of discussion which will focus on Korea, the primary countries concerned here would be limited to the six countries mentioned. For an overview of security dialogues in the Asia-Pacific see Akiko Fukushima, "Ajia Taiheiyou Seiji/Anzenhoshou Taiwa- Sajou noroukaku ka, chiiki kikou e no josouk," in Fukushima, *Lexicon: Ajia Taiheiyou Anzenhoshou Taiwa*, pp.277-310; Akiko Fukushima, "Track Two Dialogues at the Crossroads: Challenges and Options-The Case of the Hokkaido Conference for North Pacific Issues," *NIRA Seisaku Kenkyu (NIRA Policy Research)* 17:2(2004), pp.14-19 (in Japanese).

The pursuit of regionalism in Northeast Asia, Rozman says, has been "stunted" by nationalism, cross-border duplicity, historical distrust, great power rivalries, security dilemmas, and lately, U.S. unilateralism and ambivalence. Despite the failure, Rozman also notes that the foundations for a Northeast Asian regional community exist, but the tasks loom large. For a breakthrough, he advocates that the countries of the region should embrace globalization more fully, especially in terms of economic progress in balance with regionalism, work together in integrating North Korea, while recognizing South Korea's pivotal role, (the U.S. should) compromise to allow China and Japan to share leadership and focus on a long-term vision with an active role for Russia.

Although there is no official Track-One security forum for Northeast Asia, like the Northeast Asian Security Dialogue (NEASED) idea that South Korea proposed in the mid-1990s, unofficial Track-Two forums, such as the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) has been continuously pursued with government support. The new round of the North Korean nuclear crisis since 2002 has provided new momentum for regional initiatives to deal with the North Korean problem. The North Korea problem is one of the major obstacles to community building in Northeast Asia. The prospect of a nuclear North Korea enhances the security threat in Northeast Asia and the broader East Asia region. In this context, the countries in Northeast Asia have finally converged to deal with the problem as a region in the form of Six Party Talks since 2003. Although the future of the Six Party Talks is still rather precarious, and the tasks are formidable, it provides an important opportunity for regional cooperation and thus an opportunity to build the foundations for a future Northeast Asia security community. If successful, this could be a "breakthrough" for the Northeast Asian region, as Rozman would phrase it.

Can the foundations of a security community in Northeast Asia

5) Gilbert Rozman, *Northeast Asia's Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Gilbert Rozman, "Toward a Breakthrough in Northeast Asian Regionalism: Overcoming U.S. Ambivalence," *NIRA Seisaku Kenkyu (NIRA Policy Research)* 17:2(2004), pp.24-28 (in Japanese), English summary, pp.85-86. I would like to thank Dr. Akiko Fukushima of NIRA for recommending his work.

be consolidated? For the purpose of discussion, I will first define what a "security community" is, and examine the status of Northeast Asia in security community-building. Then, I will pick up on some potential building blocks for a Northeast Asia security community, with a focus on NEACD, the Six Party Talks and the NEASED idea. I will also discuss the role of the United Nations as a third-party facilitator in the process.

II. What is a "security community"?

A "security community," in this case a "pluralistic security community" in the Deutschian sense, is defined as a group of sovereign states whose members share dependable expectations of peaceful change in their mutual relations and rule out the use of force as a means of problem solving.⁶⁾ In other words, as Capie and Evans note, a "security community" exists when members have forged a sense of community or collective identity in which they will settle their differences without resorting to force⁷⁾. A security community is not the same as an alliance or collective security defense groupings, but they can potentially grow out of and co-exist with these kinds of military relationships.⁸⁾

Adler and Barnett have provided a conceptual framework, a three-stage model --"nascent," "ascendant" and "mature"-- for the development of pluralistic security communities. In the nascent

6) Deutsch categorized security communities into two categories, amalgamated and pluralistic. An amalgamated security community exists when there is a "former merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit, with some type of common government after amalgamation," e.g. the United States of America. A pluralistic security community "retains the legal independence of separate governments" such as the relationship between the United States and Canada, Western Europe. Karl Deutsch, et. al., *Political Security Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957). For a more recent work see, Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, eds., *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), "Security Community" in Capie and Evans, *The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon*, pp.198-206.

7) Capie and Evans, *The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon*, p.198.

8) Capie and Evans, *The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon*, p.198, Amitav Acharya, "The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: 'Security Community' or 'Defense Community'?" *Pacific Affairs* 64:2 (Summer 1991). See also Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*, pp.50-57.

phase, governments do not explicitly seek to create a security community, but explore how they might coordinate their relations in order to increase mutual trust and security. In the process, they often create third-party organizations or institutions to monitor state compliance to contracts and obligations, and facilitate closer relations. Cataclysmic events or crises may promote closer security ties and shared identity, which lead to the creation of more organizations and institutions, and may create the desire to forge a security community. The ascendant phase is marked by increasingly dense networks, new institutions and organizations that reflect either tighter military coordination and cooperation and/or decreased fear that the other represents a threat, deepening of mutual trust, and the emergence of collective identity that encourage dependable expectations of peaceful change. In this phase, some of the monitoring and verification mechanisms established in the nascent phase may become less important or dropped. In the mature phase, evidence of a high degree of trust, a collective community identity, and dependable expectations of peaceful change can be discerned. Thus a security community comes into existence, in which it becomes increasingly difficult for members of this "region" to think only in instrumental ways and prepare for war among each other.

In this mature phase, however, Adler and Barnett distinguish between "loosely" and "tightly" coupled communities. In a "loosely coupled community", the minimalist version, indicators of trust including the increased use of multilateral decision-making mechanisms, unfortified borders between community members, changes in military planning where contingency planning excludes other members of the community, common definition of threat, and the development of discourse by the member state that reflects the norms and the language of the community as a whole, are expected. In a "tightly coupled community," while the indicators of loosely coupled community are expected, characteristics such as development of "cooperative security" policies with other community members, and "collective security" approach with respect to external threats, high level of military integration, policy coordination against "internal" threats, free movement of populations, growing "internationalization" (sharing) of authority, decision-making, law, public policies, are anticipated.⁹⁾

III. Where does Northeast Asia lie in security community building? – Northeast Asia in the “pre-nascent” to “nascent” stage

As Capie and Evans note, examples of “mature” pluralistic security communities would be state relationships between United States–Canada, Australia–New Zealand, and those in the Baltic states, European Union/Western Europe¹⁰). In the Asia–Pacific region, the United States has used the language of “security community” concept for a time¹¹). East Asia as a region is a latecomer in the development of security communities, but as noted before, the concept of security community is increasingly being embraced by actors in this region. ASEAN leads in this sense, and is identified as a developing security community in

9) Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*, pp.55–57, Capie and Evans *The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon*, pp.199–201.

10) An expert argues that Mercado Commun del Sur (MERCOSUR) region of South America based on the core relationship between Brazil and Argentina is an emerging, “loosely coupled” security community. Capie and Evans, *The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon*, p.201, Andrew Hurrell, “An emerging security community in South America” in Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*, pp.228–264.

11) In his testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee on March 7, 2000, Commander in Chief of U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Dennis Blair said that his “vision of the way ahead for military cooperation in the Asia–Pacific is the promotion of ...security communities.” He defined this as “groups of nations that have dependable expectations of peaceful change. They genuinely do not plan to fight one another. They are willing to put their collective efforts into resolving regional point of friction; contribute armed forces and other aid to peacekeeping and humanitarian operations to support diplomatic solutions; and plan, train, and exercise their armed forces together for these operations.” However, the use of the term disappeared from official speeches. Some U.S. officials suggested the term was not appropriate for the region’s security structure at that stage, due to lack of perception of a common threat (compared to Western Europe), and that the term was linguistically unacceptable to regional states because of connotations of Western institutions. Thus, the phrase “enhanced regional cooperation” appears to have been favored at the end of 2000. See Capie and Evans, *The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon*, pp.202–204. The U.S. government has also used the term “Pacific Community” including a security component in the early half of the 1990s. Yasuyo Sakata, “The Emerging U.S. Concept for a ‘Pacific Community’ and U.S.–ROK Security Relations,” in Chae-jin Lee and Hideo Sato eds., *U.S.–Japan Partnership in Conflict Management: The Case of Korea* (Claremont, CA: The Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, 1993). For an extensive study on Asia–Pacific regionalism, see Mie Oba, *Ajia Taiheiyō Chūki Keisei e no Doutei: Kyōkai Kokka Nichigō no Identity Mosaku to Chūkishugi [Toward the Creation of the Asia-Pacific Region: The Search for Identity of Liminal Nations Japan and Australia and Regionalism]* (tentative translation) (Tokyo: Minerva Shobou, 2004).

Southeast Asia. Amitav Acharya argues that ASEAN fits the concept of a “nascent” security community and may progress into the “ascendant” stage if it can overcome some obstacles and reinvent itself as membership expands and take on responsibilities that come with expanded engagement with Great Powers relations in the Asia Pacific (e.g. ASEAN+3). If it fails, Acharya says, ASEAN may disintegrate as a community.¹²)

If Southeast Asia is in the nascent-to-ascendant stage, Northeast Asia may be in a “pre-nascent”- to- “nascent” phase in security community building. In the “nascent phase” of the Adler and Barnett model, “governments do not explicitly seek to create a security community, but explore how they might coordinate their relations in order to increase mutual trust and security.” It is true that major potential hotspots such as Taiwan Straits and the Korean peninsula remain. Deterrence and use of military force is a means to deal with conflict. US–Japan/ US–ROK alliances or the US bilateral alliance network is conceptually close to a “defense community” (i.e., military alliance and arrangements), not a security community that includes China, Russia or North Korea. The same can be said for China–North Korea, Russia–North Korea military treaty alliances.

On the other hand, countries in Northeast Asia are also seeking ways to increase mutual trust and security. In the past decade, since the end of the Cold War, bilateral and multilateral defense and security dialogues have substantially increased. In 1994, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established as an official Track–One security forum for East Asia and its partners. The Shangri–La Dialogue¹³), a defense conference, held by the

12) Obstacles such as the principle of non-interference, one principle of the ASEAN Way, that would collide with the ability to deal with transnational issues, human rights and democracy issues. Amitav Acharya, “Collective Identity and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia,” in Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*, p.219, Capie and Evans, *The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon*, pp.201–202. See also Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem of regional order* (London, UK: Routledge, 2001), pp.204–208. Compared to norms, collective identity building is another major task for ASEAN as a community. See for example, Acharya’s work above, as well as, Tobias Nischalke, “Does ASEAN measure up? Post-Cold War diplomacy and the idea of regional community”, *The Pacific Review* 15:1 (2002), pp.89–117. Nischalke argues that, in terms of ASEAN diplomacy, ASEAN qualifies as a rule-based community, but not a identity-based community.

International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)(London) since 2002, is another addition to the non-official Track-Two (or Track One-and-a-Half) channel for defense ministers and officials to discuss East Asia security issues.¹⁴⁾

There is no formal Track-One (official, government-level) cooperative security dialogue mechanism in Northeast Asia. In the post-Cold War period, South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo proposed the establishment of a Northeast Asian Security Dialogue (NEASED) at the ARF-Senior Officers Meeting in July 1994 as a Track-One, or official multilateral security cooperation framework including the two Koreas, United States, Japan, China and Russia, to discuss Northeast Asia security issues in general¹⁵⁾. This however was not realized due to lack of regional consensus, and Northeast Asia governments gathered as part of ARF (North Korea joined ARF in 2000).¹⁶⁾ Instead unofficial Track Two forums in Northeast Asia were promoted. The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) was founded in 1993 in a six-party format and has dealt with various issues in Northeast Asia security. Member countries are United States, China, Japan, Russia, South and North Korea (North Korea, however, participated in the founding meeting for the 1st NEACD in July 1993, but did not participate in plenary meetings until the 13th NEACD, September 30-October 1, 2002).¹⁷⁾ The North Pacific Working Group (NPWG) of CSCAP (the Committee on Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific) was established in July 1994. NPWG is a "six-party plus" format, which includes the six

13) Shangri-La Dialogue, International Institute for Strategic Studies, <http://www.iiss.org/newsite/shangri-la.php>.

14) For definitions of Track One-and-a-half and Track Two channels, see Capies and Evans, *The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon*, pp.209-216.

15) Chung Ok-Nim, "Solving the Security Puzzle in Northeast Asia: A Multilateral Security Regime," *CNAPS Working Paper*, September 1, 2000, Center for Northeast Asian Policy, Brookings Institution, http://www.brook.edu/fp/cnaps/papers/2000_chung.htm.

16) Chung, "Solving the Security Puzzle in Northeast Asia"; Hanns W. Maull and Sebastian Harnisch, "Embedding Korea's Unification multilaterally," *The Pacific Review* 15:1 (2002): 38.

17) Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue(NEACD) was founded in 1993 by Susan Shirk, director of University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation(IGCC) from 1991-1997. It meets roughly once a year, where foreign and defense ministry officials, military officials, and academics meet to discuss regional security issues "NEACD Wired for Peace," <http://www.wiredforpeace.org>.

parties of Northeast Asia plus other CSCAP members, such as Canada, Australia, Mongolia.¹⁸⁾

Another feature of the nascent stage --- "cataclysmic events or crises may promote closer security ties and shared identity, which lead to the creation of more organizations and institutions" --- can be discerned in Northeast Asia. The North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993-1994 prompted actors in the region to develop mechanisms for closer security cooperation. Track-One mechanisms to deal specifically with the North Korean problem have been established in response to the nuclear issue. KEDO (the Korea Energy Development Organization) is an international consortium established in 1995 on U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation and initiative (EU is also a Board member), to implement energy assistance based on the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework (provision of heavy fuel oil and construction of light water reactors). It is the first of its kind in Northeast Asia.¹⁹⁾

KEDO can be noted as an example of another feature in the "nascent stage" of security community-building, in which countries in the region "create third-party organizations or institutions to monitor state compliance to contracts and obligations, and facilitate closer relations." Since KEDO does not have a nuclear weapons program monitoring function, and no regional framework like EURATOM exists in Asia, the international organization, IAEA plays that role as a "third-party organization" to monitor compliance by North Korea regarding the nuclear freeze in the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework.

Another cataclysmic event, the Taepodong missile crisis in the summer of 1998, led to the creation of the U.S.-ROK-Japan TCOG (Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group) mechanism in 1999, for improved coordination of policy toward North Korea

18) Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), <http://www.cscap.org>. For security dialogues, region-wide, see also "Dialogue and Research Monitor: Inventory of Multilateral Meetings on Asia-Pacific Security, Human Security issues and Community building" posted on Japan Center for International Exchange, <http://www.jcie.or.jp/drm>.

19) KEDO, <http://www.kedo.org>; Scott Snyder, "Chousen Hantou Enerugi-Kaihatsu Kikou-Hokutou Ajia Chiiki Anzenhoshou Kyouryoku no tame no Senzaiteki Igi [The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization: Implications for Northeast Asian Regional Security Cooperation?]" *NIRA Seisaku Kenkyu* (Tokyo) 14:1(2001): 36-38.

a.²⁰) The most recent cataclysmic event, the new round of the North Korean nuclear crisis since October 2002, prompted the need for further and broader security cooperation in the Northeast Asia region, to include China and Russia, in the form of Six Party Talks since August 2003.

Whether “cataclysmic events” such as the North Korean nuclear crisis, can “create the desire to forge a security community” among actors in Northeast Asia is yet to be seen. Governments of Northeast Asia, however, have begun to use the term “community” in a broad sense. ASEAN+3 leaders, including Northeast Asia countries, Japan, China, South Korea have supported building an “East Asian community” as a policy goal, which includes cooperation in security fields. Furthermore, South Korean leader, President Roh Moo Hyun has specifically referred to a Northeast Asia community. In his inaugural speech on February 25, 2003, President Roh stated his goal of creating a “regional community of peace and co-prosperity in Northeast Asia like the European Union.” Roh stated that the nations in the region “will first form a ‘community of prosperity’ (in the economic field) and through it, contribute to the prosperity of all humankind, and in time, should evolve into a ‘community of peace’.”²¹

This is part of the Roh government’s version of Sunshine Policy (or “Peace and Prosperity Policy”) to create a favorable surrounding environment to promote inter-Korean reconciliation. Roh’s statements however are still very idealistic. It does not directly address the “security community” concept, like ASEAN’s “security community” idea. A more realistic concept and strategy needs to be worked out. But overall, in parallel with the broader “East Asia community” building based on the ASEAN+3 process, these are indications that some countries in Northeast Asia have a desire to create a “security community” in the future.

As discussed above, Northeast Asia may be at the embryonic stages of security community-building. Indicators of the “nascent

20) For an extensive study on TCOG, see The Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis Project: Building on the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group’s Interim Paper, *First Interim Report: Evolution of the TCOG as a Diplomatic Tool* (prepared by James L. Schoff) (August 2004), <http://www.ifpa.org>.

21) President Roh Moo Hyun’s Inaugural Speech, February 25, 2003, <http://www.president.go.kr/cwd/kr>.

stage” in security community building can be discerned in Northeast Asia. Many obstacles, however, do remain. Traditional security threats and thinking still linger. There is no regional security cooperation over regarding the China-Taiwan issue. Moreover, North Korea still remains a regime that cannot fully embrace the “community” concept. Therefore, it may be possible to say that Northeast Asia is in the “pre-nascent” to “nascent” stage of security community-building, in which, according to the Adler-Barnett model, “governments do not explicitly seek to create a security community, but explore how they might coordinate their relations in order to increase mutual trust and security.”

IV. Building Blocks for a Security Community in Northeast Asia

If Northeast Asia is at the embryonic stages of security community building, how might it be further enhanced?

The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), in its 22nd Policy recommendation (2002), advocated the creation of a “pluralistic security community” in East Asia as a long-term goal. In order to build a security community, the JFIR report called for constructing a system of regional security cooperation, and establishing “strategic convergence”(i.e., synchronize strategic directions) of the various security cooperation mechanisms, such as alliances (US-Japan, US-ROK, etc.), cooperative security (ASEAN Regional Forum [ARF], etc.), and other security arrangements in the region.²²

Among the various efforts in the region, three items that can serve as building-blocks for security community building in Northeast Asia will be discussed here. First, the NEACD’s “Principles of Cooperation in East Asia.”; second, the Six Party

22) The 22nd Policy Recommendation of the Japan Forum on International Relations Policy Council, “Building a System of Security and Cooperation in East Asia,” December 2002, <http://www.jfir.or.jp>. The Task Force members for this report were Akihiko TANAKA (Professor, Tokyo University), Hiroaki HAYASHIDA (Yomiuri Shimbun), Shunji HIRAIWA (Shizuoka Prefecture University), Ken JIMBO (Japan Institute for International Affairs).

Talks as a mechanism for dealing comprehensively with the North Korean problem; third, revival of the NEASED idea, as the next stage, beyond the Six Party Talks.

1. NEACD's "Principles of Cooperation in Northeast Asia"

The Track-Two forum, NEACD made an "arduous" three-year effort since the 3rd meeting in 1995, to develop general principles governing state-to-state relations. A joint two-year study project on "Principles of Cooperation in Northeast Asia" was conducted by selected academics of NEACD countries (United States, South Korea, China, Russia, Japan), under the auspices of Pacific Forum/CSIS, and the results were presented at the 7th NEACD in December 1997.²³⁾ As the Pacific Forum/CSIS noted, "Principles of Cooperation in Northeast Asia" is "a far-reaching document that can serve as the basis for future multilateral efforts in the region." In other words, the Principles can serve as the foundation for a security community in Northeast Asia. In fact, the Principles resemble the code of conduct among states in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC, 1976) which serves as the foundation of the ASEAN community.²⁴⁾

The NEACD "Principles of Cooperation in Northeast Asia" are as follows:

The states of Northeast Asia share the common objectives of peace, prosperity, and security in the region. To achieve these ends, they advance the following principles for cooperation in Northeast Asia:

23) North Korea was not part of this process since it joined the plenary sessions from the 13th NEACD in 2002. "Principles of Cooperation in Northeast Asia Study project" Pacific Forum/CSIS, Honolulu, Hawaii, 1-2 October 1997, at 7th NEACD, Tokyo, Japan, 3-4 December 1997, <http://www.wiredforpeace.org/neacd07.php>.

24) Article Two in TAC stipulate "fundamental principles" as follows: mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations; the right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion; non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means; renunciation of the threat of use of force; effective cooperation among themselves. "Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia," Indonesia, 24 February 1976, <http://www.aseansec.org/1654.htm>.

1. The states of Northeast Asia respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and equality; accept that other countries have different political, economic, social and cultural systems and the right to determine their own laws and regulations as well as other domestic affairs. They also recognize that they are obliged to abide by and implement international agreements to which they are a party.
2. The states of Northeast Asia will refrain from the threat or use of force against each other; will settle disputes through peaceful means; and pledge to use consultation, negotiation, and other peaceful means to prevent conflict between and among each other.
3. The states of Northeast Asia express their commitment to the protection and promotion of human rights in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.
4. To prevent misunderstanding and develop trust, the states of Northeast Asia will promote dialogue, information exchange, and transparency on security issues of common concern.
5. The states of Northeast Asia respect the principle of freedom of navigation based on international law.
6. The states of Northeast Asia will promote economic cooperation and the development of trade and investment in the region.
7. The states of Northeast Asia will cooperate on transnational issues of common concern, such as organized crime, drug trafficking, terrorism, and illegal immigration.
8. The states of Northeast Asia will cooperate in the provision of humanitarian assistance, such as food aid and disaster relief.²⁵⁾

These principles are a product of rigorous discussions among the academics of five Northeast Asian countries. The fact that "states" are stipulated as the responsible actors is of significance. It implies not only respect for national sovereignty, but also commitment of these "states" to peaceful settlement of disputes,

25) "Principles of Cooperation in Northeast Asia Study project" Pacific Forum/CSIS, Honolulu, Hawaii, 1-2 October 1997, at NEACD 7, Tokyo, Japan, 3-4 December 1997, <http://www.wiredforpeace.org/neacd07.php>.

which is a necessary condition for a "pluralistic security community." Furthermore, the principles include commitment to human rights, increased transparency on security issues of common concern, and respect for principle of freedom of navigation. Among these, human rights and freedom of navigation of the seas were contentious issues, especially the former for China, but it is significant that agreement was made to at least make a statement of common principles on these issues.²⁶⁾ Thus these Principles can serve as the basic principles to govern international relations for a security community in Northeast Asia in future discussions at the Track-One governmental level.

2. The Six Party Talks

As there were a mixture of uncoordinated venues in Northeast Asia and the Korean peninsula, the strategic interests of the six parties in Northeast Asia finally converged in the form of Six Party Talks in 2003. The Six Party Talks was created out of necessity to deal specifically with the renewed crisis over the North Korean nuclear problem since October 2002. The skeptics of "six party formats" in the past²⁷⁾, U.S., China, and North Korea came to understand the utility of this multilateral format, and thus after almost a year of no substantial talks, the first Six Party Talks were held in August 2003 in Beijing.²⁸⁾

26) "Study Project Report: Principles Governing State-to-State Relations," NEACD 4, Beijing, China, 8-10 January 1996, <http://www.wiredforpeace.org/neacd04.php>. I would like to thank Dr. Ahn Byung-joon, who was a participant in the study project, for insights on the discussions regarding these Principles.

27) South Korea has been an advocate of six-party formats. In October 1988, at the United Nations General Assembly, President Roh Tae Woo proposed the establishment of a Northeast Asia Six-Party Consultative Forum to consider peace and security on the Korean peninsula, in conjunction with his Nordpolitik policy toward North Korea. The two Koreas, Japan, United States, Soviet Union and PRC(China) would discuss issues of non-aggression, "cross-recognition" (diplomatic recognition across the Cold War divide). From 1996-98, South Korea focused on Four Party Talks (see footnote 34), but once again advocated six party talks to discuss the Korean issue in the late 1990s. Japan and Russia supported the idea, especially since 1998, but U.S. and China were skeptical, and North Korea opposed the idea. Chung, "Solving the Security Puzzle in Northeast Asia"; Maull and Harnisch, "Embedding Korea's Unification multilaterally," 38.

28) For an analysis of the Bush Administration's interest in a multilateral approach and the six party talks, see SAKATA Yasuyo, "Amerika to Chousen hantou: Bush Seiken no Tai-Kitachousen Seisaku Saikou [America and the Korean Peninsula:

As part of a nuclear deal, the Six Party Talks envisage a "comprehensive resolution." Although the scope of comprehensiveness differs by parties, the talks, in the future, may include other issues besides the current nuclear problem, namely chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles, conventional forces, and human rights/humanitarian issues. The immediate problem, though, is working out a nuclear deal. If North Korea commits to complete nuclear disarmament (including the alleged uranium enrichment program), and accept a detailed implementation plan including strict monitoring and verification measures,²⁹⁾ North Korea would be provided multilateral security assurances and energy assistance. If the other issues are addressed, long-term energy aid, economic aid, and normalization of diplomatic relations may also be considered. Some also envision a peace settlement on the Korean peninsula, to change the armistice agreement to an alternative arrangement. Thus the Six Party Talks would deal with security in a comprehensive way, including military security (nuclear, conventional and other WMD), economic security (energy, economic reform and development, agriculture and industrial reform), and human security (humanitarian assistance, human rights of refugees, migrants, and abductees). This aims to transform North Korea into a peaceful, friendly, cooperative state, and thus promote mutual security among the six parties in Northeast Asia.

3. Revival of NEASED?

The Six Party Talks reflects new political dynamics, and provides new opportunities to deal effectively with the North Korean problem. It also has the potential to become the first

Reexamining the Bush Administration's Policy toward North Korea]" in TAKITA Kenji and GOMI Toshiki, eds., *9.11 Igo no Amerika to Sekai [America and the World After 9-11]* (Tokyo: Nansousha, 2004).

29) This may also include implementing a Nunn-Lugar type program (Cooperative Threat Reduction Program) which the U.S. has taken with former Soviet Union countries, such as Ukraine, Kazakstan and Belarus. Testimony of Ashton B. Carter, "Implementing a Denuclearization Agreement with North Korea," in Hearings before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, "A Report on Latest Round of Six Way Talks Regarding Nuclear Weapons in North Korea," July 15, 2004, <http://foreign.senate.gov>.

Track One multilateral security dialogue and cooperation mechanism in Northeast Asia—a revival of the NEASED idea, except this time it would focus on the hard issues on the Korean peninsula first, instead of starting with other security issues in Northeast Asia. Government officials and experts have expressed interest in turning the Six Party Talks into a Northeast Asia security forum³⁰. (Former) South Korean Foreign Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Yoon Young-kwan noted in a speech in November 2003, that “there is a conspicuous lack of institutional mechanisms for dialogue on security matters in Northeast Asia,” and that South Korea is “determined to develop the process of the Six Party Talks into an institutional security mechanism in the region” as a long-term objective.³¹

In the same line, though in a more cautious tone, U.S. officials have also supported the idea. In a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on July 15, 2004, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly answered to a question by Senator Richard Lugar regarding the future of the Six Party Talk in the context of Asian security mechanisms, as follows: “The six-party talks are definitely a step forward. It’s absolutely unprecedented to have any kind of multilateral security dialogue in northeast Asia, and in fact, the whole process is in its infancy even though it’s some ten or I guess eleven years old now, that the ASEAN regional forum has proceeded. This in turn, is giving a little more strength to the ASEAN regional forum as well.” Kelly went on to say that each one of the parties has “very direct and national interest in a satisfactory outcome” of the six party talks, so there are “some possibilities for broadening it in the future, but for now the focus is on nuclear weapons issue on the Korean peninsula.”³²

The prospect of Northeast Asia security cooperation mechanism, however, hinges on the outcome of the nuclear issue at hand.

30) Seo Hyun-jin, “Does N.E. Asia want security body?” *The Korea Herald*, December 6, 2003; Jack Pritchard, “The Korean Nuclear Crisis and Beyond,” *Brookings Northeast Asia Survey 2003-04*, Brookings Institution, 2004, <http://www.brookings.edu>.

31) “North Korean Nuclear Issue and Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia.” Speech by Minister Yoon Young-kwan at the IFRI, November 21, 2003, ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, <http://www.mofat.go.kr>.

32) Federal News Service, July 15, 2004.

That is, whether a satisfactory resolution of nuclear disarmament of North Korea can be achieved. Progress has been made through the Six Party Talks process to work out a reasonable deal, but fundamental differences still remain regarding what a nuclear-free Korea constitutes and how to achieve it. In this sense, the future of the Six Party talks is still precarious ——— whether it can develop into a Northeast Asia security forum or whither like the short-lived Four Party Talks remains to be seen.³³

V. The Role of the United Nations

1. UN role in Northeast Asia and Korea – as facilitator

The United Nations also has a role in regional security. In Rosemary Foot’s analysis, the United Nations has played a “useful, adjunct role” in shaping the security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region.³⁴ Compared to Southeast Asia (as can be seen in cases such as peace-building operations in Cambodia and East Timor), the UN role in Northeast Asia has been limited. This is mainly due to the fact that the UN is inherently reliant on major state agreement, and the reality that major powers such as the United States and China (which are also permanent members of the UN Security Council) have worked to constrain major involvement of the UN in conflicts which they have direct security interests, namely the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan issue. As Foot reminds us, “it is essential to remember that the member states, especially the most powerful among them, can withhold their assent and deny the UN a serious role in contributing to the regional security architecture of any region in

33) The Four Party Talks (the two Koreas, plus U.S. and China) was proposed by the U.S. and ROK in 1996, to discuss replacing the Armistice Agreement with a peace mechanism and develop other military tension-reduction measures. The talks lasted for about two years, 1997-1999, without producing substantial results. North Korea was not seriously engaged and eventually participants lost interest in this format. The Kim Dae-jung government placed emphasis on inter-Korean dialogue as part of his Sunshine Policy and the inter-Korean summit of June 2000. Maull and Harnisch, “Embedding Korea’s Unification multilaterally,” 38.

34) Rosemary Foot, “The UN system’s contribution to Asia-Pacific security architecture,” *Pacific Review* 16:2 (2003), pp.207-208.

the world” so the UN cannot “take strong action on its own initiative irrespective of the views of states (cited from Roberts and Kingsbury).”³⁵⁾ Thus, the UN cannot be a “central pillar,” but can be a “useful buttress” to regional security, if the states involved desire that role.³⁶⁾ It is in this context, that the UN can play an effective facilitating and supporting role in the development of regional security cooperation and a future security community in Northeast Asia, in tandem with the major actors in the region.

The United Nations has been involved in Northeast Asia and the Korean peninsula for a long time, since the birth of Republic of Korea and the Korean War, though its role has evolved over time. In the post-Cold War period, the UN is still directly and structurally involved in the peace and security of the Korean peninsula, as a party to the 1953 Armistice Agreement. Although military defense responsibilities have been relegated from the United Nations Command (UNC) to the US-ROK bilateral arrangement (CFC: Combined Forces Command), the UNC is maintained to observe the armistice and keep the peace on the peninsula. The North Korean nuclear problem has given the UN Security Council an increased profile in non-proliferation on the Korean peninsula, but the scope of its role will be determined by the major parties involved, namely the U.S., China and Russia.

The UN has played an increasing role in non-military issues on the Korean peninsula, namely in North Korea, in the post-Cold War period. Unlike Europe, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East, Asia has no institution that falls under Chapter VII of the UN Charter that can take primary responsibility for the issue in its own region. Foot focuses on the lack of viable institutions for regional conflict resolution (which heavily depends on US-centered alliances and major power balances), but the same can be said for issues of economic and human security issues. ASEAN plays a role in politics, economy, security in

35) Foot, “The UN system’s contribution to Asia-Pacific security architecture,” p.211. Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, eds., *The United Nations, Divided World: The UN’s Roles in International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p.16 cited in Foot, p.211.

36) Foot, “The UN system’s contribution to Asia-Pacific security architecture,” pp.207,219.

Southeast Asia, but Northeast Asia has no regional organization in comparison, especially one that can deal with the North Korean problem, which is one of the major issues in Northeast Asia. Borrowing Foot’s words, “this ‘regional absence’ provides an opening –welcome or not – for a UN role.”³⁷⁾

The UN has played a role in supporting modest economic development programs, such as the Tumen River Project in the early 1990s, through the UN Development Program (UNDP). These programs, however, have stagnated, due to flawed strategies and immature conditions including North Korea’s inability and unwillingness to take necessary reform measures, and lack of real interest among major players such as the Japanese government which would be an important financial source. Mistrust among the players, and adverse security conditions also hampered the process.³⁸⁾ Environmental protection through the UNEP (United Nations Environmental Program) has been added to the agenda.³⁹⁾ Since the flood disaster of 1995, UN, along with NGOs, has taken a major role in providing humanitarian assistance to North Korea. The World Food Program (WFP), UNICEF, World Health Organization (WHO) are primary actors in implementing food aid and medical aid, with support of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator and UNDP.⁴⁰⁾ Human rights in North Korea and of North Korean refugees/escapees and economic migrants, and Japanese abductees have also become issues for the UN in recent years.

37) Foot, “The UN system’s contribution to Asia-Pacific security architecture,” p.215.

38) For an analysis of the failure, see especially chapter 3 in Rozman, *Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism*, pp.72-126.

39) The DPRK government has shown interest in agricultural sector reform and environment protection. In August 2004, UNEP issued its first report on environmental conditions in North Korea. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 29, 2004.

40) Regarding achievements, as well as the problems and dilemmas faced by the UN and NGOs in implementing humanitarian assistance to North Korea, due to North Korea’s restrictions in monitoring and access, see for example, Hazel Smith, “Overcoming Humanitarian Dilemmas in the DPRK (North Korea)” *United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 90* (July 2002), L. Gordon Flake and Scott Snyder, eds., *Paved with Good Intentions: The NGO Experience in North Korea* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003).

2. UN role in the Six Party Talks

The North Korean nuclear crisis since October 2002, has renewed UN attention on peace and security on the Korean peninsula, as it is now back on the UN Security Council agenda. In early January 2003, Secretary-General(SG) Kofi Annan appointed Maurice Strong, a veteran Canadian diplomat and special adviser to the SG, as "Personal Envoy of the UNSG to the Korean Peninsula" to facilitate and support a peaceful resolution to the nuclear issue. Here, the UN, as Foot phrased it, plays the "third party mediator" via the good-offices function of the secretary-general.⁴¹⁾ Strong, as a special envoy made three visits to North Korea⁴²⁾ (as of August 2004), met with the North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and other high-level officials, and has consulted with the other five parties, South Korea, Japan, United States, China, Russia, as well as non-regional (non-Northeast Asia) actors such as EU and Australia, which are also indirectly involved in the process, and key to a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue.

Upon U.S. insistence for a multilateral approach, China, first showing some reluctance, played a critical role in facilitating what is now known as the Six Party talks, but UN diplomacy was also instrumental mediating talks between U.S. and DPRK. While the six regional parties take the primary role, the UN, through the envoy is now indirectly involved in facilitating the Six Party Talks and in working out a peaceful resolution.

Strong, as the UNSG's voice on Korea, has supported a "comprehensive resolution" envisaged by the parties in the Six Party Talks process. In a speech at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in mid-June 2003 (before the Six Party Talks began), he elaborated on what may be the main elements of a comprehensive settlement, based on his discussions with the relevant parties. They are as follows:

- i. a non-aggression agreement in form acceptable to both the

41) Foot, "The UN system's contribution to Asia-Pacific security architecture," p.211.

42) Strong visited North Korea in January and March of 2003, and mid-May 2004.

- United States and the DPRK which may be joined by other main partners;
- ii. verifiable and irreversible elimination by the DPRK of its nuclear weapons and related programs, and acceptance by the DPRK of international inspection and verification procedures required to ensure this, and resumption of its membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
- iii. commitment to the conventional force reduction called for by the Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North of 1992 to include limitations on the development and testing of long range missiles;
- iv. establishment of full diplomatic relations between the United States and the DPRK accompanied by elimination of the existing economic sanctions and impediments to the normalization of trade, access to international financial institutions, continued humanitarian and development assistance.

A comprehensive agreement would need to include, or be accompanied by, agreed measures establishing a conducive framework for international trade, investment, institutional development and humanitarian assistance to include the necessary policy and essential reforms on the part of the DPRK and its access to membership in multilateral financial institutions.

It would also be important to include provision for the DPRK's movement towards international standards of human rights, especially for some of the countries, which would be potentially significant sources of development support and investment.⁴³⁾

This comprehensive agreement is one that resembles the position the Bush Administration takes in its policy toward North Korea, called the "comprehensive approach" or "bold approach."⁴⁴⁾ Strong went on to say in the June 2003 speech, that

43) Maurice Strong, "North Korea at the Crossroads - Prospects for a Comprehensive Settlement," Notes for Remarks Delivered at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., June 17, 2003, p.9, <http://www.ceip.org>.

44) The "comprehensive approach"/"bold approach" is consistent with the Armitage Report on North Korea policy ["A Comprehensive Approach to North Korea", *Strategic Forum* No.159, National Defense University] in March 1999. For this analysis, see Sakata, "Amerika to Chousen hantou: Bush Seiken no Tai-Kitachousen Seisaku Saikou [America and the Korean Peninsula: Reexamining the Bush

the process of reaching a comprehensive agreement would be time consuming and difficult one, and should not delay negotiations on nuclear and security issues. In this context, he recommended an "interim agreement" which would consist of an immediate freeze on the DPRK's nuclear program, resumption of fuel oil shipments by KEDO, establishment for this interim period of diplomatic links between the DPRK and the United States, suspension of existing impediments to trade and investments (i.e. lifting of economic sanctions, etc.), continuation of humanitarian and selective development support.⁴⁵⁾ This is representative of the DPRK position. Strong also hoped that the interim agreement could be accompanied by a bilateral agreement between the DPRK and Japan in resolving the abductee issue, which is an "acute thorn" in their relations, and would be an impediment to a comprehensive resolution. Japan would be one of the "potentially significant sources of development and support," as Strong implied above, which refers to the large scale economic assistance promised to North Korea after normalization in the Pyongyang Declaration of September 2002.

The Six party talks as of the 3rd Round in June 2004 have made modest progress, albeit slowly, to the point of discussing an interim agreement in the context of a complete dismantlement. Of course the devil is in the details. The U.S is willing to work out a new agreement, but is very cautious not to repeat the mistakes of the 1994 Agreed Framework, which as a result, ended up only in a nuclear "freeze" and dismantlement was delayed. Japan is also inhibited in its relations with North Korea due to the impasse on the resolution of the abductees issue.

In the Six Party Talks, the details of the nuclear/security component, i.e. dismantlement, verification and monitoring regime, is being discussed in the inter-sessional "working groups" established in May 2004. But the energy and economic assistance package is yet to be discussed, and the UN has intervened to facilitate the process. In mid-June, a week before the second round of Six Party Talks in Beijing, news reports mentioned that the UN agreed in principle to consider providing long-term

Administration's Policy toward North Korea]."

45) Strong, "North Korea at the Crossroads," p.9.

energy and economic assistance to North Korea (separate from the temporary energy assistance to be provided by South Korea, China and others, in return for a nuclear freeze). This agreement was reached in an undisclosed meeting between Strong and Kim Jong Il during Strong's visit to Pyongyang in May 18-22⁴⁶⁾. On June 25, in New York, Strong confirmed this by announcing that the UN has set up two working groups to deal with North Korea's energy issues and economic reform, i.e., "significant macroeconomic reforms" for North Korea to enter the world economy.⁴⁷⁾

The UN plan to consider providing assistance is a tactic aimed at extracting flexibility from North Korea in the Six Party Talks. "It is becoming apparent to everyone that you won't get a settlement unless you provide a broader economic package," Strong said at the news conference on June 25. According to Strong, members of Six Party Talks and a number of others such as EU strongly supported and indicated willingness to participate. But naturally skepticism was voiced from some members, especially the United States.⁴⁸⁾ To counter this point, Strong emphasized the point that the working groups are designed to "guard the negotiating process and feed into it," and not deviate from it. The UN envoy described his intent as follows: "when discussions on the weapons issues reach a point where they need to be accompanied by specific and solid economic and energy proposals, professional works designed to help make those decisions, will be available to them from an international group

46) *BBC Monitoring International Reports*, June 19, 2004, Lexis Nexis Academic, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com..>

47) *Kyodo News Service*, June 25, 2004.

48) For example, see the view of Charles Pritchard, former U.S. Representative to KEDO (May 2001-August 2003), on energy assistance to North Korea, in his statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing "A Report on Latest Round of Six Way Talks Regarding Nuclear Weapons in North Korea," July 15, 2004, <http://www.senate.gov>. Mr. Pritchard, in a private capacity, as Visiting Fellow at Brookings Foundation, specifically refers to UN involvement, but his comments indicate the need for more coordination with relevant parties. He noted that "there are several private and quasi-official efforts proceeding in the area of possible provision of energy to North Korea. One of these efforts involves the United Nations Secretary General's special envoy to North Korea. I will leave to him or others to explain how, if at all, his efforts have been coordinated with the ongoing multilateral talks and how it may or may not support a negotiated settlement." Mr.Pritchard's Statement, p.3.

not just from one special interest group.”⁴⁹⁾ Strong has consulted with relevant parties, since then, and indicated that all members of the Six Party Talks, including U.S. and North Korea will be participants in the working groups, and former U.S. officials are due to chair them. The working groups, are due to start in August and/or thereafter.⁵⁰⁾

Lastly, as part of a comprehensive settlement, Strong, in his June 2003 speech, emphasized the need for establishing “permanent peace” in Korea, namely, replacing the Armistice Agreement of 1953 with a peace treaty, and formally ending the state of war. Although first priority must be accorded to meet “the immediate security and economic concerns of the DPRK and the requirements of the international community that it abandon its nuclear weapons program,” this process toward a comprehensive settlement would be seen as the “first step in a negotiating process designed to produce a peace treaty” that will ensure the “long-term security and prosperity of the Korean Peninsula and contribute to the stability and economic progress of the entire region.” In this regard, Strong made special reference to United States Institute of Peace report on “A Comprehensive Resolution of the Korean War” and hoped that it be “seriously considered” by the main parties concerned – in particular those most directly involved in the Korean War – the two Koreas, United States and China, and the agreement be endorsed by the Security Council and the other nations that participated in the UN-mandated war.⁵¹⁾

49) Regarding an energy package, Strong said that the UN aims to provide a long-term solution to North Korea’s energy problems, and is considering “all energy options,” including various alternatives including coal, natural gas and renewable energy. *Kyodo News Service*, June 25, 2004.

50) Interview of Maurice Strong, *Asahi Shimbun*, August 6, 2004.

51) The USIP report did not advocate a “peace treaty” per se, but proposed that a comprehensive peace settlement among the 4 principal belligerents, the U.S., the two Koreas, and China, would constitute a legitimate formal conclusion to the war. Such a peace settlement could contain: formal cessation of hostilities and commencement of full diplomatic relations between the U.S. and North Korea; Recognition of sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Korea; a renewed commitment by both Koreas to the terms of the NPT, IAEA safeguards, the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, 1992 Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and North Korea (“Basic Agreement”), all of which would require Pyongyang to submit to the permanent and verified dismantling of its WMD programs; conventional force

Thus, as elaborated above, a regional process in the form of Six Party talks is in progress, albeit precariously, to establish peace and security on the Korean peninsula and the Northeast Asia region. The United Nations is taking the role of a “third party mediator” to facilitate the process. If North Korea can be successfully engaged and transformed in the process, it would be a major catalyst in the building of a security community in Northeast Asia. If the UN desires to nurture Northeast Asia regional cooperation, and an eventual security community, it should take into careful consideration of developing regional initiatives, and adequately coordinate with relevant parties, to become a “useful buttress” not a “central pillar” of the region’s security structure, as Rosemary Foot noted. That is how the UN can play an effective and constructive role in the development of a regional security community in Northeast Asia.

VI. Conclusion

Is there a security community in Northeast Asia? No. Is it possible to build a security community in Northeast Asia? Yes, though there are formidable tasks ahead. As discussed above, “security-community” thinking is emerging in the East Asia region. The ASEAN effect, with a developing security community in Southeast Asia as the main driving force, is spilling over into Northeast Asia through the ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, ROK) process with its goal to build an “East Asian community.” Whether this becomes a “loosely-coupled security community” or “tightly-coupled security community” remains to be seen. In

reductions as called for in the Basic Agreement; security guarantees by the U.S. and China for both Koreas. Complementary agreements involving economic assistance, access to international financial institutions, and humanitarian aid are conceivable, but they are not necessary components of the process of replacing the Armistice Agreement with a permanent peace settlement. Endorsement of the final agreement by the UN Security Council and the other 15 Korean War belligerents, as well as Japan, would be desirable. “A Comprehensive Resolution of the Korean War.” *USIP Special Report 106* (May 2003), <http://www.usip.org>. According to newspaper reporting, the U.S. side has proposed to North Korea ideas similar to the USIP report, i.e., replacing the Armistice with a permanent peace mechanism, as part of a comprehensive settlement for a complete nuclear disarmament by North Korea. *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, November 15, 2003.

either case, Northeast Asia will be an integral part of this broader East Asian process.

Northeast Asia may be the embryonic stage, or “pre-nascent”-to-“nascent” stage of security community-building. “Principles of Cooperation in Northeast Asia” elaborated in the NEACD Track-Two security dialogue meeting in 1997 can serve as the basic principles of a pluralistic security community in Northeast Asia. Whether this can be translated, promoted and consolidated in the Track-One sector is the test that the region faces today.

The present Six Party Talks process offers an unprecedented opportunity to take this challenge. Through cooperation on a “comprehensive resolution” of the North Korean problem, the Six Party talks has the potential to be consolidated into a Northeast Asia security forum, and thus build the foundations for regional security community in Northeast Asia. It would be a revival of the NEASED idea in a new context. For the first time, the interests of all the relevant parties, U.S., China, Russia, Japan and the two Koreas, have converged, though still precarious, in a Track-One format, to deal with common security concerns based on real national and strategic interests. Also, economic cooperation projects may for the first time be linked to overall security cooperation, which give it more centrality and reality.⁵²⁾

Third parties like the United Nations, EU, Australia, Canada, Mongolia or other security partners in or involved in the region, can play an effective and constructive role, if strategies are adequately coordinated. Convergence and synchronization of strategies toward a comprehensive resolution is essential for it to be effective. As C. Kenneth Quinones, an American aid worker and former U.S. State Department official said, “what is needed is a phased development program that draws the North Koreans out and opens them up.” He went on to say however that “South Korea is doing a hodgepodge that is not going anywhere. The North Koreans are getting everything they need, without giving anything back,” noting the problems of South Korea’s Sunshine

52) For an overview of cooperative projects in Northeast Asia, especially in energy and economy, see Hokutou Ajia Gurando Dezain Kenkyukai [Northeast Asia Grand Design Study Group], ed., *Hokutou Ajia No Gurando Dezain: Hatten to Kyousei e no Sinario [A Grand Design for Northeast Asia: Scenario for Development and Symbiosis]* (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyouron-sha, 2003) (NIRA Challenge Books Series).

Policy and its joint projects with North Korea⁵³⁾. The same dangers can occur in the energy and economic aid packages being considered in the regional and international context. Therefore, the primary role should be placed in the Six Party Talks or a future Northeast Asia Forum. Coordination within the Six Party process (if North Korea does not cooperate, in a Five-Party format), as well as with the UN and other entities are critical in developing an effective strategy to, as Rozman phrased it, “steer North Korea toward a transition that gives its leaders a way to move forward without succumbing to its WMD (weapons of mass destruction) blackmail.⁵⁴⁾”

Thus the Northeast Asia region faces a test. Can the Six Party process be developed into a Northeast Asia security dialogue and cooperation mechanism, and thus become a foundation of a security community in Northeast Asia? Or will the region retract into old habits of uncoordinated-ness. The outcome of the present North Korea nuclear crisis holds the key. The ultimate decision lies in North Korea, on whether it could give up its nuclear weapons program. But whatever decision North Korea makes, regional cooperation in Northeast Asia may show more resilience than the past, because the stakes are so high for security and prosperity of this region.

53) James Brooke, “Seoul Tries Hard to Keep Its ‘Sunshine Policy’ Free of Clouds,” *New York Times*, September 6, 2004.

54) Rozman, *Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism*, pp.366, 368-69.